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In September 2005, the Australian government 
arrested and deported Scott Parkin, a visiting US 
peace activist. This caused a storm of protest and 
greatly stimulated community interest in 
nonviolent action and threats to civil liberties. The 
Parkin case shows how an injustice can backfire 
and how activists can use an understanding of 
backfire dynamics to be more effective. 
Scott[1], a part-time community college instructor 
from Houston, Texas, came to Australia in June for
a holiday. An experienced peace activist, he set 
aside some time on the trip to meet with local 
activists, attend some actions and help run some 
workshops. 
As co-founder of a grassroots group called Houston
Global Awareness, Scott has been a vocal opponent
of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. He has 
also been a prominent critic of the firm 
Halliburton, which has massive military contracts 
in Iraq and whose former head, Dick Cheney, is 
now US Vice-President. 
Crucially, Scott is one of a many activists around 
the world who promote and use nonviolent 
methods such as rallies, vigils, strikes, boycotts, 
sit-ins and fasts in order to challenge repression 
and oppression. Nonviolent action was 
instrumental in toppling repressive regimes such 
as in the Philippines in 1986, in Eastern Europe in 
1989, in Indonesia in 1998 and in Serbia in 2000 
(Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Sharp 1973, 2005). 
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Sometimes called 'people power,' nonviolent action
is a tool that those with less formal power can use 
against injustice of any sort. 
Scott, to his surprise and dismay, was arrested by 
Australian Federal Police on 10 September, 
detained in jail for five days and then deported. 
Why? Government spokespeople wouldn't say 
precisely, only that intelligence agencies believed 
that Scott represented a 'threat to national 
security.' 
To lots of people, the government's treatment of 
Scott was transparently unjust. Outrage was 
apparent, for example, in letters to the editor 
(Sydney Morning Herald 2005). Although the 
government did not need to use anti-terrorist 
powers in order to deport Scott, his treatment 
showed the sort of thing that might be in store for 
others. 
Scott's Australian friends and fellow activists 
sprang into action, holding protests in Melbourne, 
Sydney, Brisbane, Perth and Cairns. Activists in 
Brisbane, for example, marched to the police 
building offering to be arrested as threats to 
national security. Networks of support were also 
activated in the United States, with small protests 
taking place in San Francisco and New York. 
It is fair to say that Scott's arrest and deportation 
backfired against the government. It generated 
negative media coverage for the government in 
Australia and internationally (Parkin 2005; 
SourceWatch 2005), alienated many members of 
the public and threw into question the rationale for
new anti-terrorist laws about to be introduced. 
Finally, Scott's arrest and deportation gave new 
energy to the Australian nonviolence movement, 
presumably the very opposite of what this action 
was intended to achieve.[2]
The Parkin saga can be usefully understood in 
terms of backfire dynamics (Jansen and Martin 
2004; Martin 2004; Martin and Gray 2005; Martin
and Wright 2003). The two key conditions for 
backfire are a perception of injustice and 
communication to receptive audiences. 
Perpetrators predictably use various techniques to 
inhibit public outrage, which can be conveniently 
grouped into five main methods: 
* cover-up of the action; 
* devaluation of the target; 
* reinterpretation of the event; 
* use of official channels to give the appearance of 
justice; 
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* intimidation and bribery. 
To increase the chance of backfire, it's valuable to 
counter each of these five methods. Accordingly, 
we look in turn at struggles in these five areas. 
Cover-up and exposure 
The first method of inhibiting outrage is to cover 
up the action, such as when torture is carried out in 
secret. 
Scott was arrested in Melbourne on 10 September, 
while leaving a cafe, by four plain-clothes police 
officers and two immigration officials. Scott had 
stopped at the cafe on route to a nonviolence 
workshop he planned to co-present; it would 
appear that police followed him from the house 
where he was staying in order to arrest him while 
he was away from people who knew him, thereby 
lowering the risk of exposure. 
The first person that Scott contacted after he was 
arrested was Iain Murray (co-author of this 
article), a member of the Melbourne nonviolence 
group Pt'chang and coordinator of its Nonviolence 
Training Project. Murray went immediately to the 
police station where Scott was held and began 
contacting others. Civil liberties organisations, 
sympathetic lawyers and NGOs such as 
Greenpeace were also contacted. 
Soon, a small crowd of friends and supporters had 
assembled outside the police station, showing that 
lots of people were aware of Scott's situation and 
upset about his treatment. They also encouraged 
people to ring the station asking about his welfare. 
Scott's supporters gather outside the Carlton West 
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Police Station in Melbourne, shortly after his arrest. 
Credit: Rama Cronin
Shortly after his arrest, Scott was transferred to a 
high-security prison facility. There, his ability to 
communicate with supporters or the media was 
curtailed by a ban on phone calls and severe 
visiting restrictions. 
The next day, some of the protesters issued a 
media release about Scott's detention. The media 
response was immediate, massive and largely 
sympathetic. Cover-up totally failed. 
Devaluation and validation 
The second method to inhibit outrage from an 
attack is to denigrate the targets, for example by 
labelling them 'terrorists.' 
In response to questioning by journalists, 
Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said that it was 
the role of ASIO, which had assessed Scott as a 
threat to national security, to protect Australians 
from political violence. While some media reports 
said that Ruddock had accused Scott of 'inciting 
political violence,' this wasn't literally correct. In 
essence, Ruddock tarred Scott by association. 
But suggesting that Scott was linked with political 
violence did not succeed, because he was too well 
known as a peace activist who was committed to 
nonviolence. Devaluation also failed. 
Scott's allies always referred to him, in media 
interviews, as their friend, and told journalists of 
his opposition to violence. They contacted his US 
friends and nonviolence trainers he had worked 
with during his Australian visit, asking them to 
write statements of support. Three of Scott's fellow 
trainers travelled to Canberra, the national capital, 
to hold an impromptu 'Scott Parkin School of 
Peace' in Parliament House at the invitation of 
Senator Kerry Nettle. 
When Scott was deported, his supporters contacted
the media and assembled at Melbourne Airport 
with flowers, balloons and placards reading 
'Thanks for your nonviolent work, Scott!' But the 
Government foiled this attempt to humanise Scott 
by sneaking him onto the plane through a back 
route. 
A week after Scott was deported, he was smeared 
in a front-page story in The Australian under the 
title 'Deported activist was to teach tactics of 
violence' (Sheridan and Kerin 2005). The article 
claimed that Scott 'had been planning to instruct 
demonstrators in tactics including disabling police 
horses and springing arrested protesters from 
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custody.' The authors of the article claimed not to 
have been able to contact Scott; they apparently 
did not seek comment from his friends in the 
nonviolence movement. 
Scott immediately issued a media release 
countering these claims, explaining that he 
opposed any action that might hurt animals and 
had spoken out against techniques to de-arrest 
protesters. Without credible evidence or backing, 
the story appeared to enhance backfire against the 
Government as commentators speculated on the 
nature of the story's anonymous source. 
Interpretation struggles 
The third method for inhibiting outrage from 
injustice is to reinterpret the action, such as when 
civilian casualties are said to be accidents, 
exaggerated or someone else's fault. 
The government's only attempt at explaining its 
actions was to say that ASIO had made an 
independent decision on national security grounds,
but for security reasons the actual reason for 
ASIO's assessment on Scott could not be revealed. 
In other words, the government would not explain 
why Scott had been arrested and deported. 
Ruddock stated on national radio that in the 
previous year ASIO had made nearly 45,000 
security assessments of individuals, of which only 
three were adverse, 'But the assessments, whether 
positive or adverse, are never made known 
publicly' (ABC 2005). 
In the absence of credible information from the 
government, observers could and did easily 
interpret the treatment of Scott as a blatant abuse 
of power. In the struggle over interpretations, the 
government was hardly in the game, and lost 
badly. 
Official channels 
The fourth method commonly used by attackers is 
to soothe concern by using official channels, such 
as inquiries or courts, that give the appearance of 
justice but seldom with much substance. Inquiries 
into issues such as Aboriginal deaths in custody 
give the appearance of official action, but when the 
recommendations languish the main effect is to 
diffuse public concern through lengthy procedures.
In Scott's case, official channels were the very 
means by which he was attacked. While the 
Attorney-General told the media that Scott could 
challenge the decision in the courts, officials told 
him, falsely, that an appeal would prolong his 
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detention. Furthermore, in an appeal, the 
government could use its powers to prevent giving 
reasons for its actions, for security reasons. 
Scott decided to exercise his right to appeal, while 
consenting to his removal from Australia. Even so, 
he was charged A$11,700 for costs incurred, 
including approximately $155 per night for his 
detention plus his airfare to the US and airfares for 
two agents to accompany him. 
The official channels used against Scott had little 
credibility in the wider public and did nothing to 
stop the backlash against the government. When 
Scott arrived in Los Angeles, he was once again 
free: US authorities seemed to have none of the 
security concerns that had alarmed ASIO. This 
inconsistency helped to undermine the Australian 
government's action. 
After Scott's deportation, it was reported that 
ASIO's handling of the Parkin case would be 
investigated by the official body that oversees 
Australia's intelligence agencies. Because this 
review was to be carried out in secret, it had little 
potential for giving a greater appearance of justice. 
Instead of relying on official channels, Scott's 
supporters chose to confront decision makers 
publicly and directly, in accordance with Scott's 
commitment to nonviolent direct action. Ruddock 
found himself facing a room full of supporters 
wearing handcuffs and Gandhi masks at a function 
in Melbourne, and one of Scott's friends demanded
answers from Prime Minister John Howard on live 
talkback radio. 
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Both photos: Attorney-General Philip Ruddock was
confronted by Scott's supporters at a speaking 
engagement. Credit: Anthony Bruzzese.
 
Intimidation, bribery and resistance 
The fifth and final method to inhibit outrage is 
intimidation and bribery. Scott was arrested by six 
officers and held in solitary confinement for days 
without access to his friends and family. This sort 
of treatment certainly can be intimidating. Lawyer 
Julian Burnside said that Scott had been told by 
immigration officers that if he withdrew his appeal 
- to find out why his visa had been revoked - his 
deportation date would be sooner. This could be 
classified as attempted bribery (Hogan 2005). 
Despite the intimidation, Scott made the crucial 
decision to contact a trusted friend, who mobilised 
other friends and supporters, who in turn alerted 
the media and organised further protests. These 
allies of Scott were willing to resist, with the result 
that intimidation and bribery did not succeed in 
limiting outrage. 
Conclusion 
The government tried all five methods of inhibiting
outrage from its treatment of Scott, but none of 
them worked very well. Cover-up failed because 
Scott contacted his friend, who then mobilised 
others. Attempts to slander Scott had little 
credibility because of his commitment to 
nonviolence. The government did little to explain 
its actions, so that the dominant interpretation was
that they were a blatant attack on civil liberties. 
After bad publicity, the government did not use 
any formal procedures to give an impression of 
fairness. Finally, intimidation and bribery failed, 
most importantly because Scott had allies who 
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were willing to act, and the media were not afraid 
to publish the story. 
The result was that Scott's arrest and deportation 
backfired on the government. This is most obvious 
through the surge of interest and support amongst 
the peace movement, the apparent target of the 
government's action. 
On the email list nonviolencenet, there were 
inspiring reports of actions and increased interest. 
From Cairns, Queensland, Bryan Law reported 
that, 'activist response was extraordinary for our 
town. ... People showed up to this action who have 
never turned out before for one of our peace 
actions.' Louise Cook-Tonkin from Castlemaine, 
Victoria, reported that, 'In our small town a group 
has come out of the woodwork to begin a street 
theatre group on the topic!' 
The scale of backfire was also apparent by the 
number of letters to the editor, editorials, cartoons 
and scathing articles. For example, Paul Gray in a 
newspaper article titled 'Fascists taking control' 
wrote 'We can all sleep safer in our beds knowing a 
notorious peace campaigner, Scott Parkin, has 
been deported to America by the Howard 
Government. Whew! One less troublesome 
puppeteer wearing out our footpaths. ... Is this 
really the best John Howard can do to fight 
terrorism? The Government says Parkin's 
deportation is to protect our national security. In 
reality, it's an act of political censorship.' (Gray 
2005). The whole affair became an embarrassment
for those who initiated it. 
In many ways, the Parkin saga is similar to many 
other cases of backfire, but there is an important 
difference. Normally, perpetrators find that secrecy
helps to prevent outrage, by aiding in cover-up of 
the injustice. In the way it went about arresting 
and detaining Scott, the government tried to limit 
publicity. But after the story got out, secrecy 
actually hindered the government's options for 
limiting outrage. Because ASIO's assessment of 
Scott was secret, the government could not give a 
convincing explanation for its actions: it appeared 
only to be covering up. Furthermore, it could not 
slander Scott as effectively as it might otherwise 
have done. The attack on Scott in The Australian 
presumably relied on a leak from ASIO, which in 
principle involved a security violation. Official 
channels could not easily be used to dampen public
concern because security regulations limited 
publicity. Therefore, after Scott's treatment became
known, the government's obsession with secrecy 
ironically constrained what it could do to reduce 
backfire. 
The case illustrates that backfire is much more 
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likely when the target of attack is explicitly 
committed to nonviolence. Numerous historical 
cases show that nonviolent discipline is vital in 
causing attacks to rebound against the attacker 
(Sharp 1973, 573-655). Scott's commitment to 
nonviolence made it clear to nearly all observers 
that he was not a terrorist - indeed, his approach 
was an alternative to terrorism. This made it far 
more difficult for the government to discredit him 
and to explain its actions as anything other than 
heavy-handed political censorship. 
The Parkin case not only demonstrates backfire 
dynamics in action, but also represents a practical 
application of backfire analysis. Iain Murray, a key 
figure in mobilising actions in support of Scott, was 
familiar with the backfire framework[3] and used it 
- along with his activist instincts and knowledge of 
other nonviolence campaigns, such as Otpor! in 
Serbia[4] - in choosing and designing actions, such
as efforts to validate Scott and counter attempts to 
discredit him. 
It is not surprising that backfire analysis can be a 
guide for action. Gene Sharp's classification of 
methods of nonviolent action and his analysis of 
the dynamics of nonviolent action are a form of 
grounded theory, namely constructed from 
patterns apparent through familiarity with 
hundreds of cases of nonviolent struggle. Sharp's 
frameworks therefore are quite likely to serve as 
good guides for future nonviolent struggles. The 
backfire framework, itself an outgrowth of Sharp's 
concepts, is also grounded theory, built on 
examination of tactics used in a wide range of 
cases. In fact, it is through cases such as Scott's 
that backfire analysis can be tested, refined and, if 
necessary, revised or extended. 
One important lesson from the Parkin saga, and 
from backfire analysis generally, is that attacks 
should not be feared but instead treated as 
opportunities. The Australian nonviolence 
movement contains quite a number of home-grown
activists with tremendous skills and commitment. 
They received a boost from Scott's visit, but 
ironically an even greater boost from his exit. 
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Endnotes 
1 Given our concern about validating the target of 
attack, henceforth we usually refer to 'Scott' rather 
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than 'Parkin.' 
2 The idea of backfire is based on Gene Sharp's 
concept of political jiu-jitsu. Sharp says that there 
are three groups that can be affected: the grievance
group (in this case the nonviolence movement, civil
liberties groups and others potentially targeted by 
the government's anti-terrorism powers), the 
attacker group (the government and its agencies) 
and third parties (the general public). There is 
clear evidence that the treatment of Parkin aroused
concern among the nonviolence movement and the
general public. Whether it caused any concern 
within the government and its agencies is unknown
at this stage. 
3 Brian Martin gave a workshop on backfire 
dynamics in Melbourne in November 2004, which 
Iain and other activists attended. 
4 Otpor! was a movement in Serbia that led the 
nonviolent campaign that in 2000 ended Slobodan
Milosevic's rule, as shown in the film Bringing 
Down a Dictator.
